公司治理、制度环境与盈余管理

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本书基于信息不对称理论及代理理论等，系统阐述管理层从事盈余管理活动的动机，并引出影响上市公司盈余管理行为的内部治理及外部制度环境因素，进而采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法，以我国及国际上市公司为研究对象，对内部人特征、会计准则实施、法律保护环境等因素是否影响以及如何影响上市公司盈余管理行为进行全面深入研究。

张宇扬，1984年4月生。北京邮电大学经济管理学院财会中心讲师，经济学博士，主要从事公司治理、公司理财、会计信息质量方面的科研工作，在国内外学术刊物发表论文10余篇，主持或参与国家自然科学基金项目，北京市社会科学基金项目、中央高校基本科研业务费项目等。

1 Introduction
1.1 Motivations of corporate earnings management
1.2 The determinants of corporate earnings management
1.3 Objectives of the study
1.4 Structure of the study
2 Literature review of corporate earnings management
2.1 Accounting standards and earnings management
2.2 Corporate governance and earnings management
2.3 Legal protection and earnings management
2.4 Summary and suggestions
3 How do regulatory scrutiny, accounting standards and insiders′ incentives affect earnings management? Evidence from China
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Background issues and hypotheses
3.3 Variables
3.4 Sample selection and data
3.5 Regression results
3.6 Conclusions
4 Regional legal protection and earnings management: Evidence from China
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Literature review, legal environment index and hypothesis
4.3 Variables
4.4 Sample selection and data
4.5 Regression results
4.6 Conclusions
5 Corporate governance, investor protection and earnings management: New international evidence
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Measures of earnings management
5.3 Proxies for investor protection and corporate governance
5.4 Sample selection and data
5.5 Empirical results
5.6 Conclusions
6 Conclusions and implications
Reference