Acknowledgments
IntroductiOn
I Static Games of Complete Information
1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
1.1 Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance
1.1.1 Strategic—Form Games
1.1.2 Dominated Strategies
1.1.3 Applications of the Elimination of Dominated
Strategies
1.2 Nash Equilibrium
1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium
1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria
1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria，Focal Points，and Pareto Optimality
1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or Evolution
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a Closed Graph
1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs
Exercises
References
2 Iterated Strict Dominance，Rationalizability，and
Correlated Equilibrium
2.1 Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance：Definition and
Properties
2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.3 Rationalizability
2.1.4 RatiOnalizabilitv and Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.5 Discussion
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium
2.3 Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
Exercises
References
II Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3 Extensive-Form Games
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with
Observed Actions
3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game?
3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and“Time Consistency”
3.3 The Extensive Form
3.3.1 Definition
3.3.2 Multi.Stage Games with Observed Actions
3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
3.4.1 Behavior Strategies
3.4.2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games
3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
